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The Nature of the Judicial Process. By Benjamin N. Cardozo. New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1921. pp. i8o.
This book contains four addresses, delivered before the law school of Yale
University in 19g2. They set forth the answer of an eminent justice of the highest
court of a great state to the question, "What do I do when I decide a case?"
Although the book professes to give the results of intr6spective searchings of the
author's spirit, the method is predominantly inductive.
In Nye's History of the United States it is said that Indians who saw Columbus'
ships approaching exclaimed: "At last we are discoveredl" Judges of a certain
type of mind may feel some dismay at the frank account of this voyage of dis-
covery, and some of them may be inclined to put on war paint. To change the
figure, the high priest has not merely come out on the porch of the temple to speak
to the people, he has taken them inside, and drawn back the veil. This is as it
should be. The judicial process must finally be made to justify itself to those
whom it serves, and that end cannot be measurably attained until the curtains of
consecration are taken down, the sacred garments of mystery and use and wont
are stripped off, and the smallest detail of the process is laid bare for profane
inspection and appraisal.
In a sense, there is nothing new in the book but its method. Elements of the
judicial process have been discussed before; but this account, although brief, is
vivid and complete; although daring, is not sensational or exaggerated; although
informed by genius and erudition, is lucid enough to be comprehended by law-school
students; and the account is rendered with a combination of spirit and restraint,
with that "animated moderation," which makes it as brilliant as it is convincing.
Primarily, the judicial process is search for the rule of law which governs
the case under decision. The author does not define the many-phased term "law,"
but quotes in a footnote the definition of Professor Beale (Conflict of Laws, page
133). Definitions which virtually deny the possibility of rules of general opera-
tion are rejected, the objective reality of such rules is maintained, and attributes
of law, including the exercise of compulsion, are described. Growth of the various
notions of law is incidentally revealed, from the conception of a stock of immut-
able, preordained principles, held when all things were regarded as static, to the
prevailing pragmatic conception now entertained, when all things, including the
decisions of courts, are known to be dynamic; and the relation between law and
life is expressed in the following telling sentences: "Life casts the molds of
conduct, which will some day become fixed as law. Law preserves the molds
which have taken form and shape from life."
In the great majority of cases, the rule of law and its application are plain.
A constitutional provision, or a provision of a constitutional statute, the meaning
of which is perfectly clear, may govern, and the search is ended. In the absence
of constitution or statute, the judge must look to the common law, and the search
is one for precedent. There may be ancient truth. Some principles are so well
established that we no longer examine the grounds on which they rest, any more
than we reverify mathematical formulae; and, if discovered precedent be plain,
the decision follows as a matter of course.
Constitutions enunciate general principles, which must be worked out and applied
to particular conditiong. Statutes are notoriously incomplete and ambiguous, and
interpretation is demanded. When the judicial search turns to precedent, the
trail through the wilderness may be difficult to find, and more difficult to follow.
What seems to be good precedent, may prove to be dictum when critically analyzed,
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and when, after many comparisons, a precedent is found which fairly matches the
case, the principle may need re-examination. We have come to know that the
method of the common law is inductive; rules and principles of case law are only
working hypotheses; each decision is in the nature of an experiment; and the
scientific method requires verification and testing of results whenever a change of
conditions occurs.
There comes a time when the primary function of the judicial process is
exhausted. It is ascertained that the constitution is silent The legislature has
never considered the subject under examination, and has never entertained any
intention respecting it. There is no decisive precedent. There is a gap in the
law, an interstitial space, and the parties before the court are clamoring for a
decision which shall be the embodimerft of justice. In this situation, the judicial
process, as it is known in England and America, has not halted. According to
what has been called the custom of the constitution, the judge has fashioned the
law for the benefit of the litigants before him. He has guessed at what the legis-
lature would have intended if the point had ever been presented to its mind, and
has made himself the interpreter for the community of its sense of law, under the
circumstances. "Every judge, consulting his owri experience, must be conscious
at times, when the very exercise of will, directed of set purpose to the furtherance
of the common good, determined the form and tendency of a rule, which at that
moment took its origin in one creative act."
When the judge decides the case for the parties to the suit, he fashions the law
for other parties to other suits. The author says: "Every judgment has genera-
tive power. It begets its own image ..... Once declared, it is a new stock of
descent It is charged with vital power." This tendency the author ascribes to
habit. The reviewer would say, irnitation,-following Bagehot, and not Tarde;
but whatever its psychological basis, the tendency is "one of the living forces of
the law," and in making a decisiQn, the judge must regard the direction he is
giving to the path of the law.
In determining the directive force of a principle the judicial process employs
four methods, which the author calls the method of philosophy, the method of
evolution, the method of tradition, and the method of sociology.
The method of philosophy-of logic and analogy-keeps the law consistent with
itself, excludes prejudice, favor, and all arbitrariness, insures impartiality, leads to
symmetrical development in form and substance, may even gratify the desire for
elegantia juris, and has its roots in the "constant striving of the mind for a larger
and more inclusive unity, in which differences will be recoiciled and abnormalities
will vanish."
The historical method, or method of evolution, recognizes the fact that some
conceptions of law owe their form almost exclusively to history, and cannot be
understood except as historical growths. While the author says this is true of
most conceptions of law, the illustrations are taken from times which we are
disposed to call "ancient," and the importance of the method might have been
exemplified further by reference to doctrines of recent origin, whose future course
will be guided by their history.
The method of tradition takes account of custom, which the author justly con-
cludes lacks the creative energy which it formerly possessed, and formerly lacked
the creative energy attributed to it Although custom has made new law in modern
times, its present-day function consists more in determining how established rules
shall be applied.
The fourth method, the method of sociology, takes account of that force which
the author regards as the greatest one in our day, the power of social justice.
"The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim
cannot permanently justify its existence .... The end which the law serves will
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dominate...." That end is the welfare of society. The social welfare includes
many concepts-ethical considerations, the good of the collective body, public
policy, and all that we understand by the term nwres, whether formulated in creed
or system, or immanent in the common mind, and ultimately, the test of any rule
is its social value, its ability to accomplish the end for which it was devised.
The growing dominance of the sociological method is traced in the field of
constitutional and statutory interpretation, its liberalizing effect on the common
law is shown, and a portion of one chapter of the book is devoted to the subject
of adherence to precedent, where the conclusion is reached that, while the rule of
adherence ought not to be abandoned altogether, its former rigidity ought to be
relaxed. Operation of the four methods is illu'strated by reference to American
and English decisions, and here, as throughout the book, the text is accompanied
by abundant critical apparatus, consisting of references to works of the foremost
American and European writers on history and philosophy of the law.
When the group of methods has been completed, the most fascinating phase of
the judicial process emerges. The various methods act and re-act upon one another,
and how is the judge to know how far to follow logic, what weight to give to
history, when to admit custom, when to break with precedent, how to apprehend
the mores, and in what proportion to combine them in a judgment? These ques-
tions suggest the question, "What are the rules for painting a picture?" There
are, however, some guiding principles and some acknowledged restraints. A judge
may not be an impressionist-let it be hoped, not a cubist; he may not yield to
spasmodic sentiment, or have personal opinion; he must seek external, objective
standards of morality, justice, and utility, and find them where the legislator finds
them, in the great reservoir of social experience, wisdom, and truth-in life itself.
In doing this, the judge is not free as the legislator is free. The legislator regu-
lates abstractly. The judge acts concretely, and he acts in acknowledged subor-
dination to the legislature, which is the accredited guardian of the public welfare.
Besides these, there are more impalpable restraints-tradition, example of otherjudges, the collective judgment of the profession, and the attitude of adherence
to the pervading spirit of the law. In so far as the judge succeeds, his work will
display the quality of true statesmanship.
The final element of the judicial process is the subconscious element The author
does not hold the "lonely mountain peak of mind" theory of the judge in action.
Beneath consciousness is the complex of instincts, emotions, habits, prejudices, and
convictions which make him what he is, and "no effort or revolution of the mind
will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of these subconscious loyalties."
These subconscious loyalties, as part of the total push and pull of the cosmos, may
determine the decision.
At the beginning of the book, judge-made law is accepted as one of the realities
of life. The major portion of one chapter is devoted to a discussion of "The Judge
as Legislator," and the entire book is a commentary on that subject, since thejudicial process is almost mechanical until the creative faculty is called into play.
The method of "free decision," contended for by some writers, and the notion of
"arbitrium boni iri," are of course rejected; but within the confining walls of the
narrow interstitial spaces in the law, and subject to the pressure of rules which
hedge him about on every side, the judge does innovate, and must innovate. This
method of formulating law is neither new nor revolutionary. It has been the
method of the common law for centuries. It was the method of the great chan-
cellors and the method of "the great masters," "Mansfield and Marshall and Kent
and Holmes." The subject matter of jurisprudence is plastic And malleable, and
not preordained and constant, as men have been accustomed to believe. Partition
of the powers of government is a working hypothesis. Those powers cannot be
confined in separate, rigid containers. The judicial function of originating rules
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to meet the imperious demands of new conditions persists and flourishes, because
of the human need to which it responds, and no system of jus scriptirn has been
able to escape or satisfy that need.
The author warns against the conclusion that segregating elements of the judi-
cial process and rendering them distinct, either enlarges their scope or magnifies
their importance; and to those who may feel, after reading the book, that the
judicial process does not lead to certainty, the author modestly! suggests it is not
his fault.
The subject of the book is presented in such graceful yet dignified manner, and
with such plenitude of learning and felicity of expression, that a summary robs
it of its force and its charm. Therefore the present writer recommends that the
book be read, not only by judges and lawyers, but by all who take an interest in
public affairs, since the book must be reckoned with.
The first inquiry must be, not do we like it, but is the book true? To this
question there seems but one answer. It is true; and the proof is furnished by
the American judiciary, notwithstanding the fact that some of them, according to
our custom, may file dissenting opinions. It will be distasteful to those who are
in the habit of taking refuge in such nebulosities as "a government of laws and
-not of men," to those who have not learned that truth and justice are not fixed
quantities, independent of change and growth, and to those who cannot free them-
selves from the shackles of the old speculative method. Statesmen and judges
still delve into inner consciousness and, starting with some irrefragable postulate,
deduce all the facts of nature and of life, and upon the facts so derived, declare
-rules -of right conduct. When we attempt to reach the general public and inculcate
a clear understanding of matters which must be understood before there can be
tranquillity ,under the existing system or intelligent reform, we meet the same diffi-
.culties which the -sociological method has encountered and still encounters in estab-
lishing its supremacy. At one extreme are selfish interests, obstructionists,
,conservatives, and reactionists; at the other extreme are fervid sentimental-
ists, -impractical enthusiasts, and violent reformers, who will brook Mo delay
tin acceptance -of their schemes. The demagogue and the -political axe-grinder
are not silent. Public opinion itself is inconstant, and deserts a theory with the
same ease and celerity with which the theory was embraced. Sometimes public
sentiment is created through the bearing of -false witness. Sometimes public senti-
=ent is morally wrong. Avoiding modern instances, on a fateful July morning
Alexander Hamilton went upon the field of Weehawken, stood up there, and per-
mitted himself to be shot to death, in obedience to -an unwritten law supported by
-public sentiment. Under these circumstances, our hope must be that ,the seed of
the book may fall upon as many fertile places as possible.
The reviewer is inclined to think that the conscious, -purposeful projection of
the path of the law is somewhat overstress6d. That there is effective judicial pur-
.pose is manifest, but man takes himself too seriously as lord of creation. The
silent forces which made ihim and made the various forms of his social organiza-
tions, have been potent -in making his laws. As Emerson said, we do what we
must, and call it by the best names. 'In ,Bagehot's phrase, "Something seems to
steal over society" (Physics and Politics, page 87), and, considered from age to
age, the progress of the law has been directed by forces quite independent of the
judge's will, and which continually contradict and confound him.
The author's views respecting interpretation are entirely sound. Interpretation
there must be as long as we have written or printed words to comprehend, whether
in Bible or other book, in private letter, in legal document, in statute, in constitu-
tion, or in international treaty. The power to interpret must be available for
immediate and constant exercise in the decision of controversies, and must be
lodged in the courts if they are to fulfill their function. Courts are no more
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responsible for existence of this need than physicians and surgeons and hospitals
and nurses are responsible for the existence of disease and death in the world.
While the author is wedded to consistency, as already indicated, he may be
classed as liberal in disregard of precedent. The reviewer is something more than
liberal, and the present is an opportune time to prune the tree of the law of its
dead branches.
The reviewer has no quarrel with the term "judge-made law." The mere matter
of nomenclature is ordinarily unimportant, so long as the exact facts are under-
stood. However, the term "judicial legislation" and the author's title, "The
Judge as Legislator," give no adequate conception of the limitations on the judge's
function as formulator of law, and serve to confirm in the common mind truth
of the gibe, "the legislature consists of three branches, the senate, the house, and
the supreme court." It is probably too late to correct the terminology, but clarity
of thought would be promoted if it could be done.
The author completed his task when he fully described the nature of the judicial
process. His reference to the Swiss Civil Code of 19o7, which authorized thejudge, in the absence of statute or customary law, to proceed to judgment accord-
ing to rules which he would establish if he were to assume the part of legislator,
drawing, however, from solutions consecrated by the doctrine of the learned and
the jurisprudence of the courts, was made to illustrate the proper attitude of the
modern judge toward his task. The question whether it would be feasible and
better to send us to the legislature for instruction, was not pertinent to the subject
of the book. There is early precedent for such a device in our own legal history.
Statute of Treasong, (1350) 25 Edw. III.; 2 Stat. at L. 52. The reviewer has
tried to obtain help from the legislature, without much success. On different
occasions he has prepared and presented to the legislature bills to fill gaps and
remedy defects in the civil and criminal codes, and the bills rarely got beyond
the committees to which they were referred. The legislature's attention was occu-
pied with more spectacular affairs.
Let me illustrate the subject of judicial personality as a factor in the decision
of causes: In making the play of the Merchant of Venice live on the stage before
the eyes of his audience, Henry Irving interpreted Shakespeare's words in such
a way that Shylock appeared as having all the superb dignity of a representative
of an ancient, noble, and long-oppressed race. In his insistence on the pound of
flesh he seemed but an instrument of vengeance in the hands of the offended God
of the Hebrew people. Against the appeal to mercy he stood pitiless, implacable,
but majestic. When crushed by Portia's law, he seemed turned to stone, and hefinally stalked from the stage with a sigh that made the scene one of tragic sad-
ness. Edwin Booth would allow none of this. Reading the same text as Irving,
he declared that Shakespeare had created a cruel wretch, filled with revengeful
selfishness, incapable of pity and void of mercy, and Booth so portrayed the
character.
What would the Constitution of the United States now mean if Jefferson's
choice for chief justice, Spencer Roane, had been appointed instead of John
Marshall?
RoussEAu A. BuRcx
Supreme Court of Kansas
American, Foreign Trade, as Promoted by the Webb-Pomerene and Edge Acts
with Historical References to the Origin and Enforcement of the Anti-Trust
Laws. By William F. Notz and Richard S. Harvey. Indianapolis, Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1921. pp. xv, 593.
This book deserves hearty commendation. Treating as it does of the economic
history of trade combinations and their regulation by law, it exemplifies the
combination of economic and legal points of view in making clear the development
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of "big business" in the modem world. It is not technically a lawyer's book, yet
the lawyer dealing with the subject of restraint of trade and particularly with the
export trade law (the Webb-Pomerene Act of i918) and the foreign trade financ-
ing law (the Edge Act of igig)-the goal of the discussion in the earlier parts of
the book-will find almost indispensable the economic background which will make
the statutes and their evolution intelligible. It is this economic background, illu-
minated by the statutory and judicial treatment of trade combinations, which the
book primarily emphasizes. The authors, experts in the Government service and
evidently enthusiasts in their work, as well as teachers in the new Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service, have had available the results of the exhaus-
tive studies and investigations of the Federal Trade Commission, in some of which
they participated. The result is a historical survey of trade combinations and
governmental regulation of restraints of trade and methods of unfair competition,
beginning with the common law, and developed principally by the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, leading up to
an analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act and the Edge Act The book was doubt-
less finished too soon to include the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, the
latest of the important series of statutes for the governmental control of business.
Parts I and II deal with the evolution of American trade policy, the statutory
methods of controlling combinations and trusts, the enforcement of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and its effect on particular industries and trade policy in general,
the particular evils, such as price discriminations, "tying contracts," restraints of
interlocking stock-ownership and directorships, which the Clayton Act of 1914 was
designed to meet, and the effects and operation of the important Federal Trade
Commission Act, exemplifying the new era of regulated combination by preventive
measures of supervision and guidance, rather than the somewhat impractical and
occasionally wasteful policy of enforced competition under statutory penalties.
While justly commending the advantages of prevention rather than repression, the
authors strongly believe in the retention of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as a club
against vicious monopolies. In the discussion of the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission as an investigating and quasi-judicial regulating body, designed
to prevent unfair competition, the authors barely mention the important Gratz
case (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 4o Sup. Ct. 572, and do not mention at all the Beech-Nut
case, just decided by the Supreme Court, (i92) 42 Sup. Ct ii. This is probably
explainable by the recency of these cases.. We miss also any mention of United
States v. Colgate (I919) 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct 465. The author's deprecation
of the fact that Congress refused to the Federal Trade Commission the authority,
which President Wilson sought, of passing upon the legal validity of a proposed
trade agreement, could be met by authorizing the federal courts to render declara-
tory judgments, the business association and the Commission or the Attorney-
General appearing as parties, respectively. The legally important fact that the
Trade Commission's findings of fact are conclusive in enforcement proceedings is
not stressed. In the recent Packers Act the findings of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture constitute merely prima facie evidence, so that both facts and law are open to
judicial review.
Part III deals with the various forms of trade combinations in the industrial
nations of the world at the outbreak of the world war, the extent to which the
war itself stimulated such consolidation of industrial effort in particular lines, and
the effect of these phenomena on the United States, particularly the adventitious
shift in export business to the United States and the desire and necessity of retain-
ing a large share bf this business by meeting the competition, in substance and
form, demonstrated by the more highly developed European trade associations and
combinations, with their governmental support Exhaustive studies made during
the war in all countries with a view to insuring as large a share in post-war trade
as possible produced a certain evolution in the forms of associations, integrating
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the governments in the enterprise and promoting combinations of home producers
for more efficient national competition. The United States, though fairly jparochial
in its foreign trade, was not blind to the necessities of the times and initiated such
an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission in I916. The resulting report
constituted the basis for the export trade law of i918, the most striking feature
of which is a modification of the Anti-Trust Law, which it amends, by permitting
combinations among competitors in the export trade.
Part IV presents a detailed analysis of the Webb-Pomerene law of i918.
Although comparatively new and therefore lacking judicial construction, the
authors seek by the examination of other statutes and the experience of the Federal
Trade Commission, to whom the enforcement or supervision of the Acts is
entrusted, to throw light upon its meaning. This part of the book affords guidance
to those desiring to form export associations, of which some fifty are now in exis-
tence. The authors themselves raise and offer solutions for many questions, such"
as the effect of penalizing "unfair methods" of competition though committed
abroad.
Part V deals with the Edge Act, designed to afford facilities, by private initia-
tive, for the financing of our foreign trade, now recognized as essential to our
economic well-being. The War Finance Corporation could, after Igig, no longer
carry the burden. The Edge Act is an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act,
enabling banking corporations, under federal charter, to finance exports by dealing
in acceptances and other forms of commercial paper, thus affording a means for
providing long-term credits, as foreign banks do, and more important, to issue
their own debentures, secured by foreign collateral, to American investors. The
authors fail to point out adequately that by a Regulation of the Federal Reserve
Board of March 23, i92o, no corporation issuing its own debentures could engage
in the acceptance business, thus providing in fact for two separate types of Edge
law banks. As a matter of fact, the world depression has limited both the number
and functions of the Edge law banks. Neither of the two now existing, it is
believed, have discounted any paper running for as long as one year; neither has
issued its own debentures; a third corporation, seeking large capital, had to aban-
don the enterprise. The value of the Edge law, therefore, is still problematical.
Part VI discusses various types and examples of international combines, by
which particular industries have crossed national frontiers and sought to integrate
the world's business in particular lines. The extent of this development will
surprise most readers, but it is important because it doubtless indicates the next
step in business organization. In fact, it would seem a necessary step. If the
large national units of basic industries continue to compete with one another, with
the whole force of their respective governments at their command, employing
ingenious methods of fair and unfair competition without disinterested restraint
or supervision, it is probably only a question of time before the resulting trade
war will develop into another great international war. The suggestion, again
given currency by the authors, that an international trade commission be organized,
with functions of control, guidance, supervision, and restraint analogous to those
of our own Federal Trade Commission, is eminently practical and would consti-
tute, in the reviewer's opinion, a more effective agency for the prevention of war
than any merely political league of nations.
The last third of the book consists of an Appendix containing the texts of the
various statutes discussed in the body of the work, together with typical forms of
reports, charters, and agreements of associations organized under .the Webb-
Pomerene and Edge Acts and of the agreements of various international trusts and
combines.
EDWII4 M. BoacHAt
Yale University Law School
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